File Name: computer security and control .zip
Cyber Essentials helps you to guard against the most common cyber threats and demonstrate your commitment to cyber security. Cyber Essentials is a simple but effective, Government backed scheme that will help you to protect your organisation, whatever its size, against a whole range of the most common cyber attacks. Cyber attacks come in many shapes and sizes, but the vast majority are very basic in nature, carried out by relatively unskilled individuals.
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In October a Task Force was organized by the Advanced Research Projects Agency now the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to study and recommend appropriate computer security safeguards that would protect classified information in multi-access, resource-sharing computer systems. A slightly modified version of the report — the only omissions were two memoranda of transmittal from the Task Force to the Chairman of the Defense Science Board and onward to the Secretary of Defense — was subsequently published as Rand Report R, Security Controls for Computer Systems. At that time it was felt that because representatives from government agencies participated in the work of the Task Force, the information in the report would appear to be of an official nature, suggestive of the policies and guidelines that would eventually be established. Consequently, it was felt prudent to classify the report Confidential overall.
What is Cyber Security?
In October a Task Force was organized by the Advanced Research Projects Agency now the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to study and recommend appropriate computer security safeguards that would protect classified information in multi-access, resource-sharing computer systems.
A slightly modified version of the report — the only omissions were two memoranda of transmittal from the Task Force to the Chairman of the Defense Science Board and onward to the Secretary of Defense — was subsequently published as Rand Report R, Security Controls for Computer Systems.
At that time it was felt that because representatives from government agencies participated in the work of the Task Force, the information in the report would appear to be of an official nature, suggestive of the policies and guidelines that would eventually be established.
Consequently, it was felt prudent to classify the report Confidential overall. Nearly a decade later the report is still a valuable comprehensive discussion of security controls for resource-sharing computer systems.
Ideas first expressed in this report and even occasional figures from it have gradually seeped into the technical literature, but it still contains material that has not been published elsewhere. For example, it includes an appendix that outlines and formally specifies a set of access controls that can accommodate the intricate structure of the classification system used by the defense establishment.
The original classification of the report limited its distribution largely to defense agencies and defense contractors; civil agencies of government and industry at large generally did not have access to it. Because of the continuing importance of computer security, the report is being reissued at this time for wider distribution. The question of security control in resource-sharing systems was brought into focus for the Department of Defense by a series of events in the spring and summer of Such systems were being procured in increasing numbers for government installations; the problems of security for them were becoming of pressing concern both to defense contractors and to military operations; the Research Security Administrators had forwarded a position paper through the Defense Supply Agency to the Director for Security Policy in the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense Administration soliciting action.
Since the matter involved technical issues, the paper was referred to the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering for consideration. In June , the Deputy Director Administration, Evaluation and Management requested the Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency ARPA to form a Task Force to study and recommend hardware and software safeguards that would satisfactorily protect classified information in multi-access, resource-sharing computer systems.
Robert W. A series of discussions was held during the summer and fall months of with people from the university and industrial communities, culminating in the formation by October of a Task Force consisting of a Steering Group and two Panels.
The organizational meeting was held the following month, and thereafter the Panels and the Steering Group met on a regular basis to formulate the recommendations that constitute the body of this Report.
Following are the members of the Steering Group:. The following are members of the Policy Panel:. Fred Ohm. The members of the Task Force participated as individuals knowledgeable of the technical, policy, and administrative issues involved. Thus, the views stated herein do not reflect the policy of the Federal Government, any of its agencies, or any university or industrial corporation.
Ultimately, a Report has to be written by one person. The original draft was written by Willis H. Ware using sources as noted below. It was then critiqued, modified, emended, and shaped by the members of the Steering Group and the Panels. A second complete draft was written by Thomas Chittenden, and the final version by Willis H. Each Panel produced a series of papers which formed the basis for the recommendations on software, hardware, procedures, and policy.
Holland, utilizing material provided by Willis H. Ware and other sources. Ware, incorporating material from a paper by the Technical Panel and some information from personal letters of Prof.
Part B, the Policy Considerations and Recommendations, is substantially from the final paper produced by the Policy Panel. Many of the explanatory comments come from the original paper, although some were added in the final writing. The Technical Recommendations, Part C, mainly reflect the content of two papers produced by the Technical Panel, modified to a minor extent by information from personal letters of Prof.
Ellis, December The Appendix was first drafted by Arthur A. Bushkin and Willis H. Ware; it was subsequently extended and rewritten by Mr.
Bushkin and Robert M. The final editing and details of format and style are due to Wade B. The success of a venture such as this depends upon the personal dedication and volunteer participation of the individuals involved.
In addition to the listed members of the Steering Group and the Panels, it is also a pleasure to acknowledge the contributions of Dr. Robert M. Balzer and Mr. Wade B. Meade, Maryland; and Mr. Meade, Maryland, who rewrote the entire document to produce the all-important second draft.
The subject of security control in multi-access computer systems is of sufficiently wide interest that many members of the Steering Group and the Panels contacted a number of individuals, organizations, and agencies in the course of this effort.
It would be impossible to mention every person with whom we have talked and who in some way has influenced our final recommendations. The Steering Group and its Panels also acknowledge the contributions of the many individuals who read our draft material and supplied valuable comments and suggestions. With the advent of resource-sharing computer systems that distribute the capabilities and components of the machine configuration among several users or several tasks, a new dimension has been added to the problem of safeguarding computer-resident classified information.
The basic problems associated with machine processing of classified information are not new. They have been encountered in the batch-processing mode of operation and, more recently, in the use of remote job-entry systems; the methods used to safeguard information in these systems have, for the most part, been extensions of the traditional manual means of handling classified documents.
The increasingly widespread use of resource-sharing systems has introduced new complexities to the problem. Moreover, the use of such systems has focused attention on the broader issue of using computers, regardless of the configuration, to store and process classified information. Resource-sharing systems are those that distribute the resources of a computer system e. The term includes systems commonly called time-sharing, multiprogrammed, remote batch, on-line, multi-access , and, where two or more processors share all of the primary memory, multiprocessing.
The principle distinction among the systems is whether a user must be present at a terminal, for example to interact with his job time-sharing, on-line, multi-access , or whether the jobs execute autonomously multiprogrammed, remote batch. Resource-sharing allows many people to use the same complex of computer equipment concurrently. The users are generally, although not necessarily, geographically separated from the central processing equipment and interact with the machine via remote terminals or consoles.
Each user's program is executed in some order and for some period of time, not necessarily to completion. The central processing equipment devotes its resources to servicing users in turn, resuming with each where it left off in the previous processing cycle. Due to the speeds of modern computers, the individual user is rarely aware that he is receiving only a fraction of the system's attention or that his job is being fragmented into pieces for processing.
Multiprogramming is a technique by which resource-sharing is accomplished. Several jobs are simultaneously resident in the system, each being handled by the various system components so as to maximize efficient utilization of. The operating system  switches control from one job to another in such a way that advantage is taken of the machine's most powerful — and most expensive — resources. On the other hand, a time-sharing system regularly interrupts each job in turn, allowing each to execute for some interval of time determined by the computer system itself rather than by the structure of the job.
Systems incorporating capabilities of the types enumerated represent some of the latest advances in computer technology. Basically, they are intended to provide the most efficient utilization of expensive computing facilities for the widest range of users.
A single system is able to handle several users or several sets of data simultaneously, contributing to more economical operation. In addition to the direct advantages of vastly improved resource utilization and greatly increased economy of operation, they can drastically reduce service turn-around time, enable users with little or no formal knowledge of programming to interact directly with the machine, and extend computing capabilities to many smaller installations that would be unable to support a dedicated machine.
This study, while receiving its impetus from the concern that has been generated by the increasing number of time-sharing systems, is addressed to all computer systems that may process classified material. Methods developed to insure the security of resource-sharing systems are applicable to other kinds of computing systems. The wide use of computers in military and defense installations has long necessitated the application of security rules and regulations.
A basic principle underlying the security of computer systems has traditionally been that of isolation-simply removing the entire system to a physical environment in which penetrability is acceptably minimized. The increasing use of systems in which some equipment components, such as user access terminals, are widely spread geographically has introduced new complexities and issues.
These problems are not amenable to solution through the elementary safeguard of physical isolation. In one sense, the expanded problems of security provoked by resource-sharing systems might be viewed as the price one pays for the advantages these systems have to offer.
However, viewing the question from the aspect of such a simplistic tradeoff obscures more fundamental issues. First, the security problem is not unique to any one type of computer system or configuration; it applies across the spectrum of computational technology.
While the present paper frames the discussions in terms of time-sharing or multiprogramming, we are really dealing not with system configurations, but with security; today's computational technology has served as catalyst for focusing attention on the problem of protecting classified information resident in computer systems. Secondly, resource-sharing systems, where the problems of security are admittedly most acute at present, must be designed to protect each user from interference by another user or by the system itself, and must provide some sort of "privacy" protection to users who wish to preserve the integrity of their data and their programs.
Thus, designers and manufacturers of resource-sharing systems are concerned with the fundamental problem of protecting information. In protecting classified information, there are differences of degree, and there are new surface problems, but the basic issues are generally equivalent. The solutions the manufacturer designs into the hardware and software must be augmented and refined to provide the additional level of protection demanded of machines functioning in a security environment.
The recommendations of the Defense Science Board's Task Force on Computer Security represent a compilation of techniques and procedures which should be considered both separately and in combination when designing or adopting data processing systems to provide security or user privacy. The solutions to specific problems are intended to be flexible and adaptive to the needs of any installation, rather than being oriented to any one applications environment.
It is intended that the general guidelines in this Report be of use to DOD components, other government installations, and contractors. There are several ways in which a computer system can be physically and operationally organized to serve its users. The security controls will depend on the configuration and the sensitivity of data processed in the system. The following discussion presents two ways of viewing the physical and operational configurations. The organization of the central processing facilities for batch or for time-shared processing, and the arrangement of access capabilities for local or for remote interaction are depicted in Fig.
Simple batch processing is the historical and still prevalent mode of operation, wherein a number of jobs or transactions are grouped and processed as a unit. The batches are usually manually organized, and for the most part each individual job is processed to completion in the order in which it was received by the machine.
An important characteristic of such single-queue, batched, run-to-completion systems which do not have an integrated file management system for non-demountable, on-line memory media is that the system need have no "management awareness" from job to job. Sensitive materials can be erased or removed from the computer quickly and relatively cheaply and mass memory media containing sensitive information can be physically separated from the system and secured for protection.
This characteristic explains why solution to the problem we are treating has not been as urgent in the past. In multiprogramming, on the other hand, the jobs are organized and processed by the system according to algorithms designed to maximize the efficiency of the total system in handling the complete set of transactions.
In local-access systems, all elements are physically located within the computer central facility; in remote-access systems, some units are geographically distant from the central processor and connected to it by communication lines. Another way of viewing the types of systems, shown in Fig.
About Cyber Essentials
This is a simple checklist designed to identify and document the existence and status for a recommended basic set of cyber security controls policies, standards, and procedures for an organization. This checklist helps identify a recommended basic set of cybersecurity controls policies, standards, and procedures for an organization to help reduce threats. Cybersecurity Controls Checklist. Download Resources All Resources.
Cyber security is the practice of defending computers, servers, mobile devices, electronic systems, networks, and data from malicious attacks. It's also known as information technology security or electronic information security. The term applies in a variety of contexts, from business to mobile computing, and can be divided into a few common categories. A compromised application could provide access to the data its designed to protect. Successful security begins in the design stage, well before a program or device is deployed. The permissions users have when accessing a network and the procedures that determine how and where data may be stored or shared all fall under this umbrella.
The CIS Critical Security Controls are a recommended set of actions for cyber defense that provide specific and actionable ways to stop today's most pervasive and dangerous attacks. A principal benefit of the Controls is that they prioritize and focus a smaller number of actions with high pay-off results. The Controls are effective because they are derived from the most common attack patterns highlighted in the leading threat reports and vetted across a very broad community of government and industry practitioners. They were created by the people who know how attacks work - NSA Red and Blue teams, the US Department of Energy nuclear energy labs, law enforcement organizations and some of the nation's top forensics and incident response organizations - to answer the question, "what do we need to do to stop known attacks. The key to the continued value is that the Controls are updated based on new attacks that are identified and analyzed by groups from Verizon to Symantec so the Controls can stop or mitigate those attacks. The Controls take the best-in-class threat data and transform it into actionable guidance to improve individual and collective security in cyberspace. Too often in cybersecurity, it seems the "bad guys" are better organized and collaborate more closely than the "good guys.
computer networks pdf notes. Indeed, many users unfortunately often view security and control measures as inhibitors to effective computer use. â€¢Computer.
Security Controls for Computer Systems
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